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ABSTRACT 
The set of demand revealing mechanisms for allocating private 
goods is characterized and examples are given, Auctions in which 
multiple units of either homogenous or nonhomogeneous commodities 
are studied and, in particular, it is demonstrated that there will 
generally not exist a demand revealing mechanism with which each 
bidder will pay the same price for each unit purchased. The experimental 
literature on these bidding mechanisms is discussed and several additional 
inquiries are suggested, 
1. INTRODUCTION
DEMAND REVEALING MECHANISMS 
FOR PRIVATE GOOD AUCTIONS 
Robert Forsythe and R. Mark Isaac 
Nearly two decades have passed since the publication of Vickrey's 
seminal article [1961] in which he proposed a mechanism for achieving 
an optimal allocation in sealed bid auctions. His mechanism had the 
demand revealing property that each participant had a dominant bidding 
strategy to truthfully reveal his demand schedule. Since that time, an 
extensive body of literature has been developed which examines methods 
for the auctioning of private goods (see Stark and Rothkopf [1977]) ,  
Over the same period, there has been considerable interest in demand 
revealing properties of mechanisms for the provision of public goods. 
Loeb [1977] demonstrated an iso100rphism between the private good 
auction problem and the public good institutional design problem but 
he focused his attention on one particular mechanism. None of the 
literature since his work has provided any 100re complete characterization 
of demand revealing mechanisms for private good auctions. In this paper 
we attempt to fill this void. Making use of the iso100rphism demonstrated 
by Loeb we translate the relevant theorems from the literature and then 
de100nstrate particular properties of auctions which are demand revealing. 
In practice, most auctions are held for the sale of either 
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multiple units of a single homogeneous conunodity (as in the case of the 
Treasury'security auction) or single units of several nonhomogeneous 
commodities (as, for example, the offshore oil lease auction). Due 
to this, we then examine demand revealing mechanisms for conducting 
these auctions. Further, we show that in either of these cases 
all exist a demand revealing mechanism with which there will not gener Y 
each bidder will pay the same price for each unit purchased. Even though 
a "competitive" pricing policy is not possible, the existence of 
demand revealing mechanisms insure the optimal allocation of the 
goods from these auctions. 
In conclusion we discuss the growing body of literature 
1 demand revealing mechanisms in experimental which has analyzed severa 
markets and suggest several experimental inquiries into more general 
market situations. 
2, A CHARACTERIZATION OF DEMAND REVEALING AUCTIONS 
Let N = {l, • • •  , N} be the set of N goods, possibly nonhomogeneous, 
to be auctioned and let 1 = {l, • . •  , I} be the set of I agents in the 
auction, Further, let X be the set of possible distributions 
i of the N goods to the I agents. A typical element of X• X = [xj] 
is a N x I allocation matrix where i is the amount of good j xj 
that is awarded to bidder i. The set X may be any compact set 
that 
£ x 
in a topological space. Some examples include: (a) the allocation 
of a single indivisible good to one bidder, i.e., X is a 1 x I 
and X contains all I possible unit vectors; (b) the allocation 
of a fixed supply of a single, perfectly divisible good, x, i.e. , 
I;' i -each X £ X is a 1 x I vector such that l x � x; 
id 
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(c) the allocation 
of both supply and demand allocations of a single, perfectly divisible 
I h h I;' xi <= I;' x
i·, good, i.e., X is a 1 x vector sue t at l l where B is the set 
i£B i£S 
of buyers, S is the set of sellers, and BUS= 1; (d) the allocation of 
N nonhomogeneous goods to each agent as a straightforward generalization 
of either (a), (b) or (c) . We will postpone until Section 5 any discussion 
of nonhomogenous goods and until then we will focus on the homogeneous 
good case with an exogenous inelastic supply (i.e. , either (a) or (b) 
aobve). The interested reader will note that all the propositions stated 
below directly extend to the N good case with a suitable redefinition of 
the notation, Further the introduction of sellers into the auction is also 
straightforward and for ease of exposition we will indicate any adjustments 
necessary to incorporate them into the analysis through footnotes. 
i i i Each bidder i £ 1 posses a utility function u (x , y  ) 
defined over the allocation xi £ R and money yi £ Ill which is additively 
separable in its arguments, that is 
The function 
for possible 
i i i u (x , y  ) i i i v (x ) + y , i £ 1 (1) 
vi (•) will be referred to as bidder i's valuation function 
1 allocations from the auction. We will assume that agent 
i's valuation function is restricted to some prescribed set of valuation 
functions vi. We assume further that valuation function is normalized 
such that v1 (o) = O.
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From (1), an optimal allocation of objects to bidders, 
X*(v), must satisfy2 
X* (v) e: argmax 
xe:x 
I;' i i l v (x ),
id 
(2) 
where v = (v1, • • •  , vI) e: V = X Vi are the true valuation functions 
id 
of the bidders. This simply states that the items are awarded to the 
bidders who value them the most. Since only bidder i knows his own 
valuation function, all decisions must be made using the information 
he reveals about this function. We will assume that each bidder is 
asked to report his true valuation function and that an allocation 
is made according to a decision rule satisfying {2) with respect to the 
reported valuations, In order to induce each agent to tell the truth, 
i i we will use a set of payment schedules {p (w)} id where p (w) is the 
amount of money which bidder i must pay when reported valuations of all 
1 I agents are w = (w , ... , w ) e: V, Schedules which induce each.bidder to 
report his true valuation function as a dominant strategy are referred 
to as being demand revealing. They will result if and only if 
i i( i*< 
i )i () )  i( i )i () IJ w)i ( e: v)i ( Vie: 1 v e: argmax v x w , w  - p w , w  , , • 
where 
wie:Vi 
(3) 
1 i-1 i+l I) ( i )i () - w and v)i ( = xv
i . (w , . • .,w ,w ' .. .,w ' w , w  - ' 
R.e:1\{i} 
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In the literature on public goods, payment schedules which 
have this property are known as the family of Groves' mechanisms and 
are of the form 
i p (w) - }:· wR,(xR.*(w)) + hi (w)i (), IJ we: V, IJ i e: 1,
R,d\..{i} 
(4) 
i i 3 where h ( • ) is an arbitrary function which is independent of w . 
Thi i h h bidd 1 Sum Charge' hi(w)i () , s requ res t at eac er pays a ump 
which is independent of his reported valuation, less the amount of the 
surplus of all other bidders who are awarded some positive amount of the 
R, good {since w (O) = O) . To see that this family of mechanisms are 
demand revealing suppose that given the reported valuations of all other 
k k bidders except i, w e: V , k f i, X* is the allocation matrix when bidder 
i i A i reports his true valuation function, w v , and let X be the allocation 
i matrix for any other valuation function, w , he may submit. Then 
i ( i* i*) 
i(,..i ,..i) u x , y  - u x , y  
i i* i i )i ( i ,..i i( i H() v (x ) - p (v , w  ) - v (x ) + p w , W' 
= max ( v (x ) + l w (x ) - v (x 
{ i i I;' R, R, >} ( i ,..i) 
xe:x R.e:1\{i} 
> 0 
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When dealing with the allocation of public goods, Green and Laffont 
(1977] have established the payment scheme given in (4) is also unique 
in solving the incentive problem we have posed. (See also Holmstrom 
(1979] for the most general result over restricted domains for the 
admissible valuation functions,) It may be verified that their proofs 
do not depend upon the "publicness" of the goods, and so the Groves 1 
family of mechanisms remain unique for solving the private good 
auction problem. Thus we may state the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: All demand revealing mechanisms are completely 
characterized by the Groves' family of mechanisms. 
The one shortcoming of these mechanisms that should be noted 
at this point is that no decisive mechanism exists which is efficient, 
since aggregate net payments can not be assured to sum to zero, This 
has been shown by Hurwicz (1975] and Green, Kohlberg and Laffont (1976] .  
In particular, when sellers are included i n  the analysis this means that 
no mechanism exists such that aggregate net payments by all buyers will 
necessarily equal aggregate net receipts to all sellers. 
3. PROPERTIES OF DEMAND REVEALING AUCTION MECHANISMS 
The most familiar demand revealing mechanism is Vickrey's 
second price mechanism. It can be seen that the second price auction 
i is a Groves' mechanism by specifying h ( • ) as
(5) 
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th This gives the allXlunt that all bidders, excluding the i , would be
willing to pay for the allocation which arises when bidder i is 
excluded from the auction. This is the �ximum reported surplus others 
would realize if bidder i dropped out of the market. To see that the 
payment schedule which results from using the function given in (5) 
is the appropriate generalization of the Vickrey second price auction, 
consider the case where a single indivisible good is being auctioned. 
Without loss of generality, assume that all bidders are numbered in 
descending order of their bids. In this instance, the winning bidder 
(bidder 1) must pay 
1 p (w) R, since w (O) o, R, 1' 1 
�here bidder 2 would receive the good if bidder 1 was excluded from 
�he auction, Any losing bidder i will pay 
-w1 (1) + max l wR, (xR,) 
XEX Jl£1'.{i} 
-w1 (1) + w1 (l)
= 0 
since bidder 1 will continue to receive the good if any other bidder i 
is excluded from the auction. 
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Alternative mechanisms may be constructed by specifying 
other fu�ctional forms for h (•). 
th For example, an n price auction 
is given by hi(w)i () = l wi (�i), where X £ X is the allocation 
t£h{i} 
matrix which yields the (n - 1) highest value of w (x ). st 
i t t 
t£ '-{i} 
Returning to the single indivisible good auction it can be seen that, 
for the winning bidder, 
1 n n p (w) = w (x ) , 
where wn (xn) is the bid of the nth highest bidder; and for all other 
bidders 
1 1 n-1 n-1 
= -w (x* ) + w (x ) < 0 for i > n. 
• th 
The illustration of the n price auction indicates a 
difficulty which arises with all dominant strategy mechanisms except 
for Vickrey' s. th For an n price auction all losing bidders must be 
compensated and, in general, for all other auctions except the second 
price one, all losing bidders must pay or receive some nonzero 
amount. The following proposition formalizes the result. 
Proposition 2 If a demand revealing auction mechanism possesses 
i i* the property that p (w) = 0 whenever x = 0, then it must be a second-
price auction. 
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Proof: i* i Let x = 0 then, since v (0) = O, 
0 i P (w) 
or that 
since the allocation, X*, will be the same when bidder i is excluded 
from the auction. 
In the event we wish to guarantee that the auction does 
not lose revenue we could alternatively require that pi (w) ..'.:. o V i. 
In this case, the following lemma is easily shown by a straightforward 
modification of the previous proof, 
Lemma 1: If a demand revealing auction mechanism possesses 
the property that pi (w) ..'.:. O V i, then hi (wi) ..'.:.max ) wt (xt). 
X£X id'< {i} 
Thus the second price auction provides a lower bound on the set of 
demand-revealing auctions which insure nonnegative revenue generations. 
A further difficulty with this class of auctions has been 
'studied by Green and Laffont (1978] for public goods. If, in 
designing.an auction, we concern ourselves with the fact that some 
bidders may be required to pay an amount greater than their budget, 
,then we must further restrict the set of admissible auction mechanisms, 
For the analogous public goods case to the auctioning of one unit of an 
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indivisible private good they require that the bid of each agent be 
bounded by' 
(6) 
i where M is the budget of agent i. With this bidding constraint they
i show that the set of admissible functions h ( • ) is bounded below by 
hi(w) i () < max l w� (x�) .  
X£X �£1"{i} 
Combining this result with Lemma 1, it is clear that the only 
auction which restricts bankruptcy and insures a non-negative 
revenue generation is the second price auction. This, however, no 
longer insures that the item is awarded to the bidder who values it 
the most. As they show, each bidder has a dominant strategy to 
i i i report w (1) • min [v (l) , M  ] and as the following example indicates, 
the allocat·ion specified by (2) need no longer be attainable, 
Let there be two bidders with the valuation functions 
v1 (1) = 10 and v2 (1) = 5. Suppose that tpe budgets of the bidders
are J = 4 and M2 = 6 and that they enter a second price auction 
for the object, with no bidding constraint. Then bidder 1 will be 
awarded the object and be required to pay 5 units of the private good 
which exceeds his budget, Alternatively, if the bidding constraint 
(6) is imposed, bidder 2 will be awarded the object and will be 
required to pay 4 units of the private good. 
If there are multiple units of a commodity to be awarded, the 
second price auction loses its dominant strategy property. Consider an 
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example where there are two items to be awarded using a second price 
auction and there are two bidders. If the first bidder wins 
' 
2 both items then he must pay w (2) and if he wins only one item he 
2 2 must pay w (2) - w (1). If we assume that both bidders have 
non-negative marginal utility for this connnodity, i.e., 
i i w (2) _'.'.. w (1) .'.'.. 0, then for the first bidder to remain solvent
we must be assured that w2(2) � J if he wins both items. Such
will be the case if we constrain his bidding in an analogous 
4 manner to the single unit case above by requiring 
1 1 1 w (1) � w (2) � �. 
In this instance, if bidder one wins two units the amount he will pay, 
w2(2) , must be less than J or else bidder two would have received at
least one unit. 
In order to see that there are no dominant strategies for 
1 bidder one under this constraint, suppose v 
(O, 6, 10) and let his budget be given by J 
1 1 1 ) (v (0) , v (1) , v (2) 
7. Further suppose for
the following situations bidder two's bidding constraint is never binding 
so that he always will truthfully reveal his valuations. We may 
consider strategies for the first bidder of the form w1 = (w1 (0) , 
1 1 w (1), w (2)) = (0, 2, 7). We consider the following three cases: 
Case I: 
Case II: 
Case III: 
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If v2 = (0, 7, 13 - E) and E > O, then for E arbitrarily 
small w > 6 and bidder one will receive one unit of the 
commodity and pay 6 - E. 
2 If v = (O, 7, 13 + E) and E > 0, then for E arbitrarily 
small w < 6 and bidder one will not receive any of the 
c0Dm10dity and will pay nothing. 
From the first two cases, we need only to concern ourselves 
with considering w 6 as a dominant strategy. Let 
v2 = (0, 3, 5 ), then w1 = (O, 6, 7) will reward bidder 
one with one unit of the commodity and he must pay 
v2(2) - v2 (1) = 2 units of the private good, His net 
payoff is 4 in this instance. Alternatively let 
w1 = (O, 3 1/2, 7) , Here bidder one will receive both
2 units of the commodity and will pay v (2) = 5.  With 
this outcome his net payoff is 10 - 5 = 5 ,  Thus w = 6 
is not a dominant strategy. 
Thus the lack of a dominant strategy in these environment 
provides a caution in instances where auctions are being designed where 
the solvency of agents is potentially a problem. For the remainder 
of this paper, however, we shall overlook these considerations, 
4. THE GENERAL NONEXISTENCE OF ONE-PRICE DEMAND REVEALING AUCTIONS 
In an one-price auction each successful buyer pays the same 
price for each unit he is awarded. Unlike discriminative auctions 
in which successful buyers pay what they have bid, one-price auctions 
are analogous to competitive market mechanisms. Smith [1967] , Belovicz 
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[1979] , Miller and Plott [1980], and Grether, Isaac and Plott [1979] 
have examined one-price auctions within the context of experimental 
markets. In fact, Miller and Plott study a market in which buyers 
may purchase multiple units in which they all pay the highest rejected 
bid for each unit. For their parameters, the one-price auction is 
demand revealing and they find that after replication, bidders report 
their true valuation. 
Indeed, Engelbrecht-Wiggans [1980] states "If several 
identical objects are being auctioned, and players may bid on how 
much they would pay for the first, second, etc., objects awarded to 
them, then an appropriate extension of the [Vickrey] model is to set the 
price of all objects equal to the highest unsuccessful rejected bid." 
Unfortunately, even though this institution is seemingly analogous 
to Vickrey's second-price auction the demand revealing properties of that 
mechanism do not extend. We will show that one-price auctions are not 
in general demand revealing in the multiple unit case. In addition, we 
will demonstrate the correct extension of the Vickrey mechanism in the 
case of multiple units. 
Prior to presenting these results, one observation is in order. 
Namely, if successful bidders are to pay the same price there must be 
at least one excluded bidder (i.e., a bidder who does not receive 
any units) . From (4), bidders must face a payment schedule which is 
unrelated to their own bids. Thus, all rejected bids which are 
made by buyers who also are awarded units of the commodity must be 
excluded from consideration, Even if we were assured that one excluded 
bidder were to exist (for example, in an auction in which there were 
more bidders than objects to be awarded) , demand revealing one-price 
auctions still do not exist as the following example illustrates, 
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Suppose there are three indivisible, identical objects to 
be awarded and there are four bidders. Consider an auction in which 
all winning bidders must pay the highest rejected bid for each item 
they receive. The bidders' marginal valuation functions are given in 
the following table: 
� 1 2 3 
1 100 70 so 
2 7S 40 20 
3 60 30 20 
4 30 20 10 
TABLE 1 
If each bidder were to bid his true valuation it is easy to see 
that bidder 1 would receive two of the objects and bidder 2 would 
receive one. They each would pay the highest bid of bidder 3, 
namely 60 for each item purchased. In this case bidder l's net 
change in utility form the auction would be 
100 + 70 - 2 (60) so. 
Alternatively suppose bidder 1 reported the valuation function 
w1(1) 1 1 100, w (2) =lSO, w (3) 
lS 
200, 
so that his marginal valuations would be 100, SO, and SO, respectively. 
In thia case one unit would be awarded to bidders 1, 2, and 3 and 
they each would pay 30 (the highest rejected bid of bidder 4) . In 
this case bidder l's net change in utility from the auction would 
be 100 - 30 = 70, and thus he is better off misreporting his true 
preferences. 
The difficulty with one price auctions may be seen by 
examining the payment schedule in (4) . If each buyer is to pay the 
same price, say q, for each unit purchased then the arbitrary function 
hi(w) i () must be given by. 
(7) 
i i Since h ( • ) must be independent of w ,  the price q must be independent 
of the reported valuations of all successful bidders. The difficulty 
i arises since X* in general depends on w • As a direct application 
of Proposition 2, we know that for (7.) to hold for all possible values 
of xi* > 0 then, when xi*= O, the function is specified by Vickrey' a 
mechanism, where 
Jl !l* ) w (x (w) ) 
Jl d\{i} 
max l wJl (xJl (w)) ,
X£X Jld'{i} 
(8) 
Unfortunately, when extended to the case of multiple units, Vickrey's 
mechanism does not yield a one-price auction. This has been previously 
demonstrated in Forsythe, Isaac, and Walker [1979]. 
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If there are N units to be sold, then using (8) it can be 
seen that the Vickrey mechanism specifies that a bidder who is awarded 
J units must pay the J highest losing bids excluding his own. Using 
the valuations given in Table 1, bidder 1 would receive two units 
and must pay the sum of the two highest nonwinning bids excluding 
his own, i. e .  , 
1 
P (w) 60 + 40 100. 
Bidder 2 would receive one unit and would pay the highest nonwinning 
bid excluding his own, i. e. , 
2 p (w) = 60.
Although this mechanism is demand revealing it may be readily verified 
that it cannot be a one-price auction since bidder l's payment is not 
twice as much as bidder two. If there are multiple units to be 
awarded there will be a single price auction only in the event where 
there is a sufficient number of identical bids at the highest rejected 
bid (as in the design of Miller and Plott) , 
Alternatively, in the case where �i* can take on only two
values, say 0 and N, a single-price auction specifies that a bidder will 
pay 
0 
N 
where bidder k is the first excluded bidder in the auction. 
Here it is always true that there is a sufficient number of identical 
bids at the highest rejected bid since only one such bid is required, 
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A second example of a one-price auction which is found in the 
literature is due to Marschak.5 In this mechanism, the seller of a 
single object writes a price on a card and places it face down on a 
table. There is one potential buyer who is then permitted to make a bid 
with the understanding that he will be awarded the object at the 
seller's price if and only if his bid is greater than the price 
recorded by the seller. It is easily seen that the buyer has a dominant 
strategy to truthfully reveal his valuation for the object since if 
he overstates his valuation he will be forced to buy at some unfavorable 
prices and if he understates it he will lose the opportunity to buy the 
object at some desirable prices. 
If there are two or more potential buyers and the seller 
has only a single object for sale then each buyer no longer has a 
?ominant strategy to truthfully reveal his valuation. This will 
occur when the buyer with the second highest valuation is also 
willing to pay more than the seller requires, This buyer has an 
incentive to overstate his valuation since if he wins the item 
he will only pay the seller's price. Thus the incentive properties 
of the mechanism will be restored in this instance only if the seller 
is willing to sell as many objects as there are potential buyers. 
In order to extend this mechanism to include many potential 
buyers it must be assumed that the seller is willing to report a 
perfectly elastic supply curve over the relevant range. Only 
then will all buyers necessarily face a one-price auction. This 
is best seen by examining the payment schedule for this mechanism, 
Using (4) , this is given by 
pi(w) = - l w1 (x1*) +ex*+ max 
iEB'{i} XEX 
V i £ B 
where c is the seller's reported constant marginal cost. From 
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(8) 
footnote 1, recall that the seller is assumed to reported the negative 
of his total cost function. Examining the form of (8) it should 
be obvious that the seller's price auction is the same as the Vickrey 
second-price auction. With a perfectly elastic supply curve, the buyers 
who receive items when bidder i is included in the auction will 
coincide exactly with the allocation which results when bidder i is 
excluded. The only 
i* 
difference is that the seller will now sell 
i = l x 2 x* 
iEB,{i} 
I:' i* 
= l x units of his product. 
iEB 
schedule in (8) becomes 
= c (x* - i) 
i* ex 
Thus the payment 
thus all buyers will pay the same price for each unit they receive. 
It is the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply curve 
that renders the seller's price mechanism useless for the case of 
Treasury security auctions, for example. In order to maintain both 
one-price and demand revealing properties of this mechanism, the Treasury 
would have to be willing to set a price and fill the orders of all 
buyers who report a willingness to pay in excess of this price, 
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Unless an accurate prediction of demand schedules can be made, the 
Treasury would effectively be unable to limit the total supply of 
securities sold in a given auction. 
Another difficulty with the seller's price auction stems from 
the fact that the seller is not included in the mechanism and that it will 
not be a dominant strategy for him to reveal his true reservation 
price. By overstating his true prices, he will increase his revenues 
in many cases. If the seller does indeed have a perfectly elastic 
supply curve, it would be possible to include him in the auction 
in order to have his true marginal cost reported as a dominant 
strategy. 
By exactly the analogous argument used to derive Proposition 
2, if a seller is to receive no payments and pay no charges when he makes 
no sales then he must also face a second-price auction. Thus, 
i 
P (w) = 
+ 
- L w1 (x1*> - l w\x1*> 
iEB . iES,{i} 
l w1 (xJ!.)] , v1£ S 
i£S\{i} 
In the case described above with a single seller, (9) becomes 
i 
P (w) 
(9) 
since there is no supply to be sold when the seller is excluded from 
J!, the auction and w (0) = O, V J!, £ B. This implies that the seller must 
receive the total surplus of all buyers in the auction or, in other 
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words, be rewarded as a perfectly discriminating monopolist. It should 
be noted that this result does not depend upon a perfectly elastic 
supply curve although it most certainly holds in that case also. 
This is precisely what drives the result of Loeb and Magat [1979) who 
find the 1110nopolistic utility can be regulated in a decentralized 
fashion since it will truthfully reveal its demand function if it is 
promised the total consumers' surplus as a reward. 
5, DEMAND REVEALING MECHANISMS AND MULTIPLE GOOD AUCTIONS 
When there are multiple nonidentical goods to be auctioned, 
the design of an institution becomes trickier. For the case of m objects 
to be allocated among n bidders, there are 2m - 1 valuations which each 
bidder may possess, If either the objects are auctioned off sequentially 
or, as in the case of offshore oil lease sales, they are auctioned off 
similtaneously but only m bids may be submitted by each bidder, the 
resulting allocations may be far from optimal. Further, it is not 
at all clear what constitutes demand revelation in either of these two 
institutions since, for example, a bidder may be unable to even express 
that his valuation on an object depends upon whether or not he receives 
one or more other objects. 
Any member of the family of Groves' mechanisms may be used to 
overcome these diffi�ulties. If the number of objects, m, is large, 
however, the advantages of demand revealing mechanism may be outweighed 
by the large computational cost which arises from each bidder having 
to submit 2m - 1 bids. For a small number of objects the auction 
remains relatively simple as the following example illustrates for the 
second price auction. 
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Consider an auctioneer wishing to sell the last two remaining 
specimens of a rare stamp (designated for convenience the left (L) and 
right (R) stamps) , These stamps could conceivably be sold as a pair, 
P, or as individual items, L and R. With the appropriate extension of 
the Vickrey mechanism, the "bundling" decision is endogenous to the 
auction. 
For ease of exposition, let us assume that there are three 
bidders, and that each bidder values the pair more than his sum of 
valuations on the individual stamps. (Neither of these assumptions 
is necessary for the mechanism to work) . Specifically, suppose that 
the true valuations of the three bidders are as follows: 
Bidder L R p 
A $ 5 $10 $16 
B $12 $ 6 $21 
c $ 2 $ 3 $17 
22 
For the optimal allocation decision (2) to hold, the auctioneer 
will "pack�ge11 all possible combinations of left and right stamps, and 
award the stamps to the package which maximizes reported willingness 
to pay. With truthful revelation, the nine packages from this example 
would be 
L B, R A $22 
p = B 21 
p c 17 
p =A 16 
L = B, R = c 15 
L c, R = A 12 
L A, R = B 11 
L ,. c, R = B 8 
L = A, R = c 8 
The left stamp would be awarded to person B, the right stamp 
to person A. The payments for each would be figured as in Table 2. 
Note that not only is this extension of the Vickrey auction 
not a one-price auction, it is not even a second price auction 
in that the sum of the payments does not equal the second highest 
package value either including or excluding persons A and B. 
6. MULTIPLE GOOD AUCTIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY
Interest in the properties of auctions and bidding behavior 
has always been grounded in naturally occurring allocation problems. 
The use of laboratory experimental methods has proven to be especially 
fruitful in testing hypotheses about auction behavior. 
For Person A 
For Person B 
For Person C 
TABLE 2 
$ -12 
= $ 21 
$ 9 
$ -10 
$ 17 
for A 
$
--7- for B 
$ -22 
$ 22 
$ 0 for C 
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Some versions of demand revealing mechanisms have already been 
the subject of laboratory experimental testing. In particular, 
the Vickrey mechanism for the single unit case (i.e., the second-
price auction) has been examined in the laboratory. Smith (1978] 
and Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980] report the results of experiments 
in which the second-price auction was compared to a first price 
auction and to the seller's price auction discussed in Section 4. 
It was found that many subjects "learned" their dominant strategy 
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fairly rapidly, but that violations of single period dominant strategy 
behavior'were common, especially in the "early" trials of an experimental 
session. 
More often than not, however, the naturally occurring allocation 
problems concern multiple good auctions: either the seller is disposing 
of N > 1 units of a ho1IVJgenous connnodity (Treasury security auctions, 
for example) or of several different, nonho1IVJgenous connnodities (the 
auction of offshore oil leases). Not surprisingly, there has been a 
tremendous a1IVJunt of interest in laboratory experiments involving 
multiple good, sealed-bid auctions (some examples are Smith [1967]; 
Belovicz [1979]; Smith, Williams, Bratton, and Vannoni [1979]; Grether, 
Isaac and Plott [1979]; Miller and Plott [1980]; Cox, Roberson, 
and Smith [1980]; Cox, Smith, and Walker [1980], and Palfrey [1980] . )  
Much of the work has focused on multi-unit discriminative auctions or some 
form of multiple unit "competitive" auctions. To our knowledge, there 
have been no systematic tests of the family of demand revealing 
mechanis�s whihc we have described (although in Cox, Smith, and Walker 
[1980], the restriction that each person may bid for at most one unit 
allows the one-price competitive auction ,to have truth as a dominant 
strategy). There are several potentially interesting areas of inquiry 
about the extension of Vickrey mechanism to multiple good auctions: 
1) The demand revealing mechanisms we have described tend to be
comparatively more complicated than when only a single unit of a good is at 
auction. Would subjects do as well at "learning" their dominant strategy as 
they did in the Smith [1978] and Coppinger, Smith, and Titus [1980] experiments? 
2) The simple competitive one-price auction for multiple 
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units is not, in general, incentive compatible. Yet, it may be that, 
for certain parameters, truthful relevation is a dominant or perhaps a 
Nash equilibrium strategy. Nontruthful behavior could be very 
complicated to discover or risky to attempt. Smith [1967], Grether, 
Isaac, and Plott [1979], and Miller and Plott [1980] have found that 
the "single-price" multi-unit auctions were relatively successful 
in providing demand revealing behavior. Smith, Williams, Bratton, 
and Vannoni [1979] found that a two-sided, uniform price sealed bid 
auction performed poorly when bidders could submit only one bid for all 
units; but when participants could submit complete inverse demand 
and supply schedules, the amount of demand revealing behavior increased. 
How would the performance of these uniform price processes compare with 
the theoretically demand revealing, but operationally 1IVJre complicated, 
extended Vickrey mechanisms. The comparisons could include demand 
revealing behavior, stability, revenue generating properties, etc. 
3) With the exception of recent work by Palfrey [1980], there
have been few experimental examinations of multiple-commodity private 
good auctions. As discussed in Section 5 the extended Vickrey mechanism 
for multi-commodity auctions has very strong informational requirements. 
It would be interesting to test this mechanism against simultaneous and/or 
sequential auctions which have milder informational requirements but 
which also has poorer efficiency properties. 
4) Given the interest in one-price auctions, it would be 
interesting to examine a seller's price auction as outlined in Section 
4. In particular assume that a seller does not have a perfectly elastic 
supply curve but nonetheless is asked to report some price at which 
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he will be willing to fulfill the demand of those buyers who report a 
willingness to pay no less than that amount. Let buyers face the 
demand revealing mechanism described by (8) and let the seller 
receive the revenue from the auction. With this one-price mechanism 
the size of the inefficiency generated by the reported price of 
the seller could be examined and the revenue generating properties 
of this auction could be compared to previous work. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. i i i For sellers, u (x , y  ) may be thought· of as a profit function 
i i with v (x ) as the negative of producer i's cost function. 
2. If supply decisions are also endogenous then (2) becomes 
i i where, recall v (x ) 2 0, V i £ S since it is the negative of producer 
i1s cost function. As in the usual competitive model, X* is 
the equilibrium quantity. 
3. As noted in the introduction, Loeb [1977] has previously recognized 
that this family of mechanisms, originally described for public 
goods, also satisfies the private good problem. However, he
focused his attention on one particular member of this family.
4. For a formal derivation of constraining the admissible strategy 
space in this manner, see Green and Laffont [1978] . 
5. As reported in Smith [1979] , Jacob Marschak described this procedure
in the early 1950s. 
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